In what follows, I will share a brief (1700-word) review of David Naugle's 2012 book on the Christian practice of the philosophical discipline. I hope the review will give you a good summary of Naugle's intentions and content; but I hope moreover that it will spur you to read his book for yourself (it is a relatively quick read at only 114 pages) and to passionately engage in philosophical investigation to the glory of God.
Naugle, David K. Philosophy:
A Student’s Guide. Reclaiming the Christian Intellectual Tradition (David
S. Dockery, ed.). Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2012. 125 pp.
David Naugle’s slim volume endeavors to challenge
Christian philosophers to ensure that their philosophy is being done coram Deo – before the face of God
(19). As part of a series geared toward identifying and building upon a faithful and intentional
Christian scholarship, Naugle’s desire is that Jesus Christ be the Lord of his
(and your) philosophy (101).
Naugle identifies five core goals that he is seeking
to achieve: (1) Highlight the importance of prolegomena, or the identification
of worldview presuppositions “that serve as a prelude to and govern any
inquiry.” (2) Spell out the
relationships of Christian worldview, Christian philosophy, and regular
philosophy. (3) Articulate elements of a
Christian philosophy based on faith in God and biblical worldview in
philosophic subdisciplines. (4) Show how
a Christian philosophy in subdisciplines can “serve as a guide by which to
interact with regular philosophy in affirmative, critical, corrective,
complementary, and creative ways.” (5)
Explain how the content of biblical worldview shapes “an understanding of the
Christian philosophic vocation.” (16-17)
Goals (2), (3) and (4) are pursued in the body of
the book (chapters 2 through 6), where Naugle considers the impact of
Christocentric philosophizing on the major philosophical subdisciplines of
Metaphysics, Philosophical Anthropology [Philosophy of Mind], Epistemology,
Ethics, and Aesthetics, respectively.
There is some excellent work contained within those chapters. For example, while writing about Philosophical
Anthropology, Naugle notes that, alone among sundry varieties of ‘humanisms’,
Christian humanism has “an adequate basis for believing in the value and worth
of human beings in the doctrines of creation and incarnation.” (57) Other
humanisms—e.g., secular humanism—lack the requisite philosophical foundations
“to support their enthusiastic affirmations of people.” (ibid.) It is a subtle,
yet crucial point. Yes, humanisms of
different flavors all affirm the worth, integrity, and inherent value of human
beings. However, secular humanism sees
human beings ultimately as the result of accidental collisions of atoms, living
creatures spawned by an undirected, ateleological, random evolutionary process. Thus, the secular humanist’s affirmation of
human worth, integrity, and value is spoken in a metaphysical vacuum—it is a
rhetorical edifice without foundation, built upon the shifting sands of
culturally relative proclamations.
Elsewhere, Naugle’s discussion of Augustine and the
‘Greatest Good’ (summum bonum) is a
refreshing reminder that philosophy seeks truth and human flourishing, not just
investigation and criticism (80-82). His
proposed Trinitarian solution to the problem of the one and the many is both
innovative and persuasive (45-46). His
insistence that a Christian metaphysic of
necessity rejects the culturally-prevalent naturalism is a necessary
reminder (42-43).
In my opinion, however, the greatest strengths of
Naugle’s work lies in the opening and closing chapters. At the outset, Naugle pursues his first goal,
highlighting the importance of philosophical prolegomena. He insists that the existence (and
sovereignty) of our Triune God has impact upon all areas of philosophy. “In light of these realities, we have to ask
different questions and participate in new conversations, if we are to reclaim
a Christian intellectual tradition in philosophy. In short, we want to know how to philosophize
in light of God and the gospel.” (20)
Naugle then deals with the profession to objectivity
and religious neutrality in secular (or ‘mainstream’) philosophy. Many philosophers (including, unfortunately,
many Christian philosophers), give no consideration to presuppositions or
starting points. All philosophers,
however, begin their philosophizing from a position of faith in something: the object of faith may
differ, but all philosophers are, at heart, believers in something. “Various and sundry controlling stories and control beliefs quietly guide the thoughts
and lives of philosophers, even if the philosophers themselves claim to bracket
their prejudices when doing philosophy.” (24) Thus, notions of religious
neutrality, the idea that only Christian philosophers have presuppositions or
biases, is simply mythical. “All
philosophers are religious philosophers,” and Christian philosophers should
thus be intentional and unapologetic about resting their philosophies upon the
Triune God whom they know and worship (25).
“Christian philosophers ought to be Christ followers, and Christian
faith ought to be the primary source of Christian philosophers’ philosophy” in
the subdisciplines of philosophical investigation.
Unfortunately, as Naugle notes, many Christian
philosophers have unintentionally allowed their philosophy to be steered and/or
controlled by non-Christian philosophers and philosophical schools of
thought. Naugle is a fan of learning
from any and all philosophers (see, e.g., 29, 105-07), but insists that “a
Christian philosophy requires a biblically sound prolegomena, not an
interloper.” (23) While Arthur Holmes proclaims rightly that “All truth is
God’s truth,” Naugle reminds the Christian philosopher that not everything
presented in philosophy is truth. The Christian should have the Triune God as
the starting point of all of his or her philosophy. Naugle closes his opening chapter with five
further suggested elements of “A Christian prolegomena” to philosophy: (1)
Distinction between God and creation; (2) Grace restores nature; (3) Sin
permeates creation but is distinct from creation; (4) Common grace enables all
people (including the unredeemed) to make “remarkable contributions to life and
the world”; (5) Christian scholarship is Hebraic (focused on revering God) rather than Greek (focused
on comprehension) or modern (focused
on utility). (26-30)
In his concluding chapter, Naugle elaborates upon
his conception of the Christian philosophic vocation. He once again asks: Is Jesus Lord of your
philosophy? (101)
“It seems to me that a fair
number of those who claim to be Christian philosophers assume various stances
associated with this discipline that are unbecoming of followers of Christ. …
Whether Christian philosophers are thinking, teaching, and living in a manner
worthy of the gospel is a matter that ought to be addressed.” (101)
Christian philosophers should not be afraid to be
counter-cultural in their research and scholarship, nor should they “be too
quick to embrace historic or contemporary philosophic fashions and ideas unless
they fit well with our Christian commitments.” (108) Christ, not culture, gives
the “marching orders” for the Christian philosopher. Naugle interacts briefly with Max Weber’s
vision of academia as merely a purveyor of information (not worldview),
concluding that even if professors embrace that perspective (which I highly
doubt—most university professors do desire for students to embrace their view
of the world, not just the information they teach), students emphatically do
not (109). Students (in my view rightly)
do look to their professors for factual information, but also for worldview and
lifestyle emulation. Hence, the warning
of James 3:1 applies to (and should be taken seriously by) all professors, but
particularly by Christian faculty members.
Naugle rightly notes that all philosophers have
“hitched their wagon” to someone who has come before—there is no one who begins as a truly autonomous,
independent thinker (105-06). Like
Naugle, I am happy to hitch my philosophical wagon to the figure of Augustine
of Hippo—to have a biblical faith seeking understanding in philosophy as in other areas of life, and to eschew the twin
errors of pure self-reliance and rational autonomy (113).
Naugle closes his appeal to Christian philosophers
with an eightfold noble path (110-13), culminating in a reminder that
“Practitioners of a Christian philosophic vocation will one day be judged for
their fidelity or infidelity to the way in which they conducted their callings
as Christian philosophers.” (113)
Naugle’s work provides a helpful and necessary
prolegomenon to contemporary Christian philosophy. It may be too late for this fall, but I am
strongly considering using it as a supplement to my primary Introduction to
Philosophy text. The biggest strength of
the work, in my opinion, is its emphasis upon doing intentionally Christian philosophy rather than doing philosophy while being a Christian. I agree with Naugle that too many
contemporary Christian philosophers have starting points (and hence
conclusions) that are taken from secular (and sometimes explicitly un-Christian
or anti-Christian) perspectives and/or philosophers. This is not to question the authenticity of
those philosophers’ faith in Christ; it may be, however, to question their faithfulness to the discipline of Christian philosophy. As Alvin Plantinga has noted, Christians know
some things that should result in them practicing their craft differently than
non-Christians do—nowhere is this more true than in philosophy (well, perhaps
it’s even more true in theology, I suppose).
Naugle’s identification of five philosophical
subdisciplines, while not exhaustive, seems to be somewhat problematic. He does deal with epistemology, and the
crucial area of truth and naturalism (62-63).
However, he does not even mention the burgeoning (and significant) field
of philosophy of science, nor the rise of scientism in contemporary
society. I, for one, would have
preferred a chapter dealing with philosophy of science, even if it had to come
at the expense of his (very well-done) chapter on aesthetics.
One could also perhaps criticize Naugle for a lack
of specifics. For example, while he
insists that many philosophers have hitched their wagon to non-Christian
philosophical sources, he does not provide any examples (barring one passing
reference to the untoward effects of Greek philosophy upon Christian
philosophy). Nonetheless, it is not
Naugle’s intention, it seems, to provide such specifics. Rather, he desires to leave the reader (and
the potential targets of his critique) to ask and answer some pertinent
questions, questions which I invite you to share.
Are we conducting our philosophy coram Deo? Are we philosophizing in light of the truths
of God’s existence and nature? Are we
meditating upon human nature given the truths of Christ’s incarnation and human
fallenness? Who have we hitched our
philosophical wagon to? Do the ‘isms’
which we consciously or unconsciously accept from mainstream philosophy (23)
help or hinder our understanding and love of God? Are we teaching and writing in such a way as
to draw students and readers closer to God?
Or are we putting intellectual or affective obstacles in their way? Are my starting points God, Scripture, and
redemption, or some other secular interlopers (23)? In short, am I doing philosophy to the glory
of God, or is something else my goal?
In sum, Naugle offers a clarion call to reclaim
Christian philosophy as an essential and
faithful element of a robust Christian intellectual tradition. A concise work, it will be well worth the
time you spend reading it. Highly
recommended.
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